United States Supreme Court Administrative Law Decisions of Note During the 2024-2025 Term

In this update, we cover the most impactful Supreme Court cases related to administrative law issues decided during the 2024-2025 term. The Supreme Court decided important administrative law cases falling into these general categories: (1) constitutionality of agency structure and action; (2) the proper challengers and venue for challenging agency action; and (3) agency authority and reasonableness of agency action. As discussed below, each of the cases decided this term will have significant implications going forward.

Constitutionality of agency structure and action:

Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research 

• Summary 
  • The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) collects fees from telecommunications providers for its Universal Service Fund, a program that subsidizes telephone and broadband services to promote affordable access. The Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), a private nonprofit, administers the program. Consumers’ Research is a non-profit organization that sought to challenge the program. Consumers’ Research argued that Congress unconstitutionally delegated its taxing power by allowing the FCC and USAC to determine the amount telecommunications companies must contribute to the program. 
• Ruling 
  • Delegating to the FCC and USAC does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Congress provided an “intelligible principle” by requiring the FCC to collect “sufficient” contributions and defining the program’s beneficiaries and services. The sub-delegation to USAC is permissible because USAC only proposes contribution amounts. The FCC reviews and approves USAC’s proposals.
• Implications
  • The nondelegation doctrine remains narrow, only requiring Congress to provide an intelligible principle. The Court will generally uphold agency authority and defer to the means through which the agency structures its programs.

Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Braidwood Management, Inc.  

• Summary
  • The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force) issues recommendations for preventative care coverage under the Affordable Care Act. The Task Force recommended HIV prevention drugs, but certain religious groups opposed that inclusion. Braidwood Management challenged the Task Force’s recommendation by arguing that the appointment of Task Force members by the Secretary of Health and Human Services violated the Appointments Clause.
• Ruling
  • The appointment of Task Force members by the Secretary does not violate the Appointments Clause. Task Force members are inferior officers because the Secretary can remove them at will and block their recommendations. Because department heads can appoint inferior officers, the Secretary could appoint the Task Force members at issue.  
• Implications
  • Narrowly, this ruling affirms the Secretary’s oversight authority over the Task Force. More broadly, it affirms that the various secretaries of US executive agencies have broad oversight authority over scientific advisory panels, and it further defines the dividing line between inferior and principal officers.

The proper challengers and venue for challenging agency action:

Food and Drug Administration v. R. J. Reynolds Vapor Co. 

• Summary 
  • R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company (RJR) applied for Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authorization to market its e-cigarettes. The FDA denied the application. RJR sought to challenge the denial orders in the Fifth Circuit in a joint petition with Texas e-cigarette retailers. The FDA argued that venue was improper because the retailers were not “adversely affected” by the denial orders and therefore could not seek judicial review under the Tobacco Control Act. 
• Ruling
  • The retailers are “adversely affected” and may seek judicial review. The Court broadly interpreted “adversely affected” according to its meaning in the Administrative Procedure Act as “arguably within the zone of interests.” The retailers are “adversely affected” because the denial orders interfere with their ability to sell a new tobacco product. Thus, the Fifth Circuit is a proper venue. 
• Implications
  • FDA actions under the Tobacco Control Act are now subject to broader judicial oversight. More broadly, the ruling sheds further light on how “adversely affected” is interpreted under the Administrative Procedure Act and therefore which parties may file challenges (and where) to other agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency

• Summary 
  • The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved a waiver allowing California to adopt standards for emissions and electric vehicle production that are stricter than federal standards. Fuel industry groups challenged the approval. The D.C. Circuit found that the fuel companies (which are not directly regulated by EPA’s action) lacked standing because they failed to show that their injury is redressable by a favorable court decision. Vehicle manufacturers (which are directly regulated by EPA’s action) did not challenge the action.
• Ruling
  • The fuel companies have standing to challenge the waiver. There is an injury in fact for purposes of standing because fuel producers are economically harmed when gasoline demand drops. There is causation because the regulations deliberately reduce gasoline use. The injury is redressable because canceling the waiver would likely lead to more gas vehicles and fuel sales. The Court reached this determination on redressability because courts can make reasonable economic inferences when evaluating standing. 
• Implications 
  • Affected stakeholders can challenge agency regulations that indirectly harm them, even if they are not the directly regulated party. Such potential challengers can rely on commonsense economic principles to establish standing. This ruling would likely apply to any instance where a producer sells to a party that is covered by the law or regulation at issue.  

Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas

• Summary 
  • The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) granted Interim Storage Partners a license to operate a nuclear waste storage facility in Texas. The State of Texas and Fasken Land and Minerals (Fasken) challenged the license, arguing that the NRC exceeded its statutory authority when it licensed a private storage facility. Texas and Fasken were not parties to the NRC’s licensing proceeding.  
• Ruling
  • Only parties to an NRC licensing proceeding can seek judicial review of the licensing decision under the Hobbs Act. Parties to a licensing proceeding include license applicants or intervenors who request a hearing and are admitted as a party. Texas and Fasken were not entitled to judicial review of the license because they had not formally intervened in the NRC licensing process.
• Implications
  • Those who wish to challenge an NRC licensing decision must formally intervene in the licensing proceeding. Other means of participation, such as commenting on a draft environmental impact statement, are not sufficient. Because the holding rested on the interpretation of the Hobbs Act, other agency actions (including Federal Communications Commission actions) may not be directly reviewable unless a party intervened in the agency decision-making process. The Court largely avoided the broader question about the NRC’s statutory authority.

Environmental Protection Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC 

• Summary
  • Small refineries can petition EPA for exemption from Renewable Fuel Standards under the Clean Air Act based on “disproportionate economic hardship.” EPA denied numerous petitions based on the rationale that hardship must stem directly from compliance costs and that EPA assumes that certain costs will pass through to consumers. Several refineries challenged the denials in regional circuits. EPA argued that the D.C. Circuit is the proper venue under the Clean Air Act because the denials are nationally applicable or, alternatively, based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. 
• Ruling
  • The D.C. Circuit is the proper venue. An EPA action that is “nationally applicable” is reviewable only in the D.C. Circuit. An action that is “locally or regionally applicable” is reviewable in the regional circuit, unless it is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and EPA has published that determination. The petition denials are locally or regionally applicable actions with “nationwide scope or effect” because EPA’s rationale regarding compliance costs applied generally across refineries.  
• Implications
  • This ruling defines the “nationwide scope or effect” venue exception and allows EPA to consolidate litigation in the D.C. Circuit for local actions that are based on a nationally applicable analytical method.

Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency 

• Summary 
  • States submit Implementation Plans (SIPs) to comply with National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act. EPA issued a Federal Register notice disapproving the SIPs of several states, based on a four-step framework to address interstate pollution. Oklahoma, Utah, and industry groups challenged the disapprovals in various regional circuits. EPA argued that the D.C. Circuit is the proper venue because the disapprovals were nationally applicable or, alternatively, based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.  
• Ruling
  • The SIP disapprovals are locally or regionally applicable and reviewable in a regional court of appeals. The SIPs are locally or regionally applicable because they each pertain to a specific state. Even though EPA used the same analytic method for its disapprovals, the disapprovals are not “nationwide” because each is limited in geographic (i.e., statewide) scope. The actions are not based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect either because of the state-specific nature of the plans.
• Implications
  • This decision limits EPA’s ability to consolidate challenges in the D.C. Circuit by bundling local actions in one nationwide rule. Future litigation may further clarify the boundaries of the exception for local actions that are based on a determination of “nationwide scope or effect.” Combined with Calumet Shreveport Refining, the Court has now set forth two fact patterns by which to distinguish which side of the line falls into a determination of nationwide scope or effect (venue at the D.C. Circuit) and those that do not (venue at the local circuit).

Agency statutory authority and reasonableness of agency action:

Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado 

• Summary
  • The Surface Transportation Board (STB) approved an 88 mile railway connecting Uinta Basin oil and gas resources to the national rail network. Eagle County and environmental groups challenged the approval under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They argued that the environmental impact statement (EIS) failed to consider the indirect environmental impacts that would result from upstream oil and gas drilling or from downstream petroleum refining. 
• Ruling
  • The STB did not need to evaluate the possible environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that were separate from the proposed railway project. As we noted in a previous alert specifically for this case, agencies only need to analyze impacts directly tied to the project. NEPA is a purely procedural statute, and courts owe agencies a high degree of deference in the NEPA context. Courts evaluating an EIS must defer to the agency’s level of factual detail, identification of significant environmental impacts and feasible alternatives, and determination of scope. 
• Implications
  • This significant ruling narrows the scope of NEPA judicial reviews and can be expected to deter some NEPA litigation going forward. Over the longer term, it may also allow for more efficient agency approvals because the record for judicial review will not need to be made immune to fly-specking challenges.  

Food and Drug Administration v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC

• Summary 
  • The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) denied manufacturers’ applications to market flavored e-cigarette liquid products. The FDA based the denials on insufficient evidence that the benefit to adult smokers outweighed the risk to youth. The FDA did not evaluate the manufacturers’ marketing plans, which the FDA previously said were critical. The manufacturers argued that the denial orders were arbitrary and capricious because the FDA improperly changed its standards without notice and refused to consider the marketing plans. 
• Ruling
  • The FDA’s denial orders were not arbitrary and capricious. The denial orders were consistent with the FDA’s statutory mandate and earlier guidance requiring rigorous scientific evidence and considering youth public health risks. The Court subjected the FDA’s failure to review marketing plans to a harmless error standard, which directs courts to remand only if the error likely changed the outcome. The Court sent the case back to the Fifth Circuit to apply this standard. 
• Implications
  • Agencies have leeway in interpreting laws and changing policy. Courts are less likely to override agency decisions unless the agency clearly deviates from its own standard or makes an error that affects an outcome. This case may be helpful for defending agency actions in the future when the basis for the challenge is that the agency deviated from guidance it had issued previously. It is also possible, however, that the implications of the case may largely be limited to the particular statutory scheme at issue under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA), which, according to the Court, left the agency broad discretion to decide which type of scientific evidence applicants must submit.

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency 

• Summary
  • San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that spills overflow wastewater into the Pacific Ocean during heavy rains. San Francisco’s permit for the system under the Clean Water Act included “end-result” provisions that held the city liable if pollution levels in the receiving waters exceeded water quality standards. San Francisco challenged the provisions for lack of clarity and accountability and for exceeding EPA’s statutory authority under the Clean Water Act. 
• Ruling
  • The EPA overstepped its authority by including vague “end-result” water quality provisions in San Francisco’s wastewater permit. The EPA can impose specific effluent or narrative discharge limits to meet water quality standards, but the agency cannot hold cities accountable for the overall quality of the body of water they discharge into. Permit holders should only be bound to clear, identifiable standards. 
• Implications
  • This decision may increase procedural burdens on the EPA and restrict the EPA’s regulatory reach. The EPA must now craft permits with clear pollutant discharge requirements, not general “end-result” catch-all provisions. Additionally, the Court’s evaluation of the term “effluent limitations” may have broader statutory-construction implications, including in the Clean Air Act, where the statute authorizes emissions limits.

The attorneys at Womble keep a close eye on pertinent developments at the Supreme Court—and the courts more broadly—and frequently apply new Supreme Court holdings on the ground in litigation or in advocacy before administrative agencies. We would welcome the opportunity to guide clients through the implications of these decisions or any related issues.