Evolving Venezuela Sanctions: 2026 Executive Actions and General Licenses Redefine Compliance Landscape

This alert was prepared by members of Womble Bond Dickinson's Venezuelan Task Force. We will be following developments closely and providing regular updates.

The United States has imposed an evolving regime of economic sanctions regulations on Venezuela since 2015, including both targeted and sectoral sanctions regulations administered by OFAC pursuant to the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (“VSR”) at 31 CFR Part 591. 

OFAC is the lead U.S. agency for implementing, administering, and enforcing economic and trade sanctions on countries, individuals and entities. This includes country-based sanctions (e.g., via comprehensive embargoes on countries/regions such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and the Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions of Ukraine), list-based sanctions (e.g., via the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”), and activity-based sanctions prohibitions. The SDN List is the most significant OFAC sanctions list, and if a party is designated on the SDN List, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are generally prohibited from entering into any type of business transaction with the targeted party anywhere in the world, and the targeted party is cut off from the U.S. financial system. In addition, U.S. persons are required to block any assets of the designated party that come within the U.S. person’s possession or control, and not deal in such assets. Importantly, any entity that is owned 50% or more by a party (or an aggregation of parties) on the SDN List is also subject to SDN List prohibitions, even if that party is not itself expressly designated on the SDN List.

At a high level, U.S. sanctions regulations and associated prohibitions (such as OFAC’s VSR program and its associated underlying Executive Orders) generally apply to U.S. persons (e.g., entities organized in the United States, U.S. citizens wherever located, and persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction). Primary OFAC sanctions prohibit such U.S. persons from dealing with embargoed countries and sanctioned individuals and entities, and can include certain activity-based restrictions as well. These sanctions also impact non-U.S. transaction activity that involves a so-called “U.S. nexus” (e.g., the direct or indirect involvement of a U.S. financial institution, transactions involving U.S.-origin goods, facilitation of a third-party transaction that would be prohibited by U.S. sanctions if conducted by a U.S. person, etc.). Certain specific OFAC sanctions programs also include “secondary” sanctions which do not necessarily require a U.S. nexus, and can impact non-U.S. persons directly or indirectly engaged in certain significant transactions relating to countries like Russia and Iran, or who provide material support to certain sanctioned parties.

Evolution of OFAC Venezuela Sanctions Regulations

OFAC’s VSR program generally dates back to Executive Order (“EO”) 13692 issued in 2015 by President Obama, which authorized OFAC to impose list-based sanctions (e.g., via the SDN List) on individuals and entities determined to be involved in undermining democratic processes, human rights abuses, and public corruption in Venezuela. In 2017, President Trump issued additional EOs targeting then-President Nicolás Maduro’s government as well as PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil and gas company.

In 2019, PDVSA was designated on the OFAC SDN List, and EO 13884 was issued blocking all property of the Government of Venezuela. EO 13884 broadly defined the “Government of Venezuela” to include:

• the state and Government of Venezuela; any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Venezuela and PDVSA;
• any person or entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the foregoing; and
• any person who has acted or purported to act directly or indirectly for or on behalf of, any of the foregoing, including as a member of the Maduro regime.

Notably, OFAC does have the authority to issue both General Licenses (which statutorily authorize otherwise prohibited activities in a sanctioned region or with sanctioned parties and without a U.S. company needing to obtain additional written approval from OFAC) as well as Specific Licenses (which come in the form of written approval issued by OFAC in response to a license application). However, outside of the limited authorizations issued by OFAC in the VSR in the form of General Licenses, typically U.S. persons have been required to obtain an OFAC Specific License to deal directly or indirectly with any Venezuelan government official or entity, regardless of whether they are on the SDN List.

In 2022, President Biden pared back certain OFAC VSR sanctions, including by issuing a General License to allow Chevron to resume oil production and import and export through its joint ventures with PDVSA. In 2023 and 2024, additional OFAC General Licenses were issued more broadly authorizing certain oil and gas sector transactions in Venezuela that would otherwise be prohibited under the VSR. However, those General Licenses were subsequently revoked by OFAC or were otherwise declined to be renewed. 

2026 OFAC VSR Developments

In light of the removal of Venezuelan President Maduro on January 3, 2026, the Trump Administration has taken various actions to expand Venezuela-related oil trade and investment opportunities for U.S. companies. That being said, the framework of OFAC’s VSR program still stands, and numerous individuals and entities in the region (including the Venezuela Government and associated government-owned entities) are still subject to a wide array of targeted sanctions.

On January 9, 2026, President Trump issued EO 14373 (“Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People”) to protect certain Venezuelan oil-related revenues from attachment or other judicial processes. Specifically, EO 14373 imposes protections applicable to “Foreign Government Deposit Funds” held in U.S. Treasury accounts that are derived from the sale of natural resources from, or the sale of diluents to, the Government of Venezuela or its agencies or instrumentalities (e.g., the Central Bank of Venezuela and PDVSA)—and states that such covered funds are to be the sovereign property of Venezuela held by the United States in a governmental custodial capacity (in effect creating a legal shield around these assets, and preventing private claims by judgment creditors of Venezuela). 

Most recently, OFAC has issued three General Licenses (“GLs”) which authorize certain transactions relating to Venezuela-origin oil and petroleum products, as well as U.S.-origin diluents.

First, on January 29, 2026, OFAC issued GL 46, which authorizes “established U.S. entities” to engage in certain transactions involving the Government of Venezuela, PDVSA and associated entities that are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the lifting, exportation, reexportation, sale, resale, supply, storage, marketing, purchase, delivery, or transportation of Venezuelan-origin oil, including the refining of such oil.”^[1]

GL 46 defines “established U.S. entity” as an entity organized under U.S. law on or before January 29, 2025. However, such an entity cannot be owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, (i) by or in a joint venture with a person located in or organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China, or (ii) by a person located in or organized under the laws of the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, or the Republic of Cuba. The text of the GL indicates that transactions must be carried out by the U.S. entity and not by any non-U.S. affiliate, however non-U.S. persons can generally provide the various services, financial transactions and logistics that are ordinarily incident and necessary to carry out the transactions. 

Further, “Venezuelan oil” includes crude oil as well as other petroleum products, which are defined to include “unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and miscellaneous products obtained from the processing of crude oil (including lease condensate), natural gas, and other hydrocarbon compounds.”^[2]

Certain support services are also authorized, including services related to arranging logistics, security services, shipping, marine insurance, and arranging port and terminal services.^[3] OFAC has stated that downstream trading activities, coordinating payment structures, and financing related cargos or receivables also are activities covered by GL 46.^[4]

GL 46 does not authorize exploration activity or negotiations for new investment in the Venezuelan oil sector, nor does it authorize transactions that are not on commercially reasonable terms; payment in gold or the use of debt swaps; payments denominated in digital currency, digital coin, or digital tokens issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, including the petro; the unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to the VSR; or any transaction involving a blocked vessel. GL 46 imposes strict conditions on payments made pursuant to its authorization, and any payments to blocked persons must be made either into Foreign Government Deposit Funds (i.e., funds paid to or held by the U.S. government on behalf of the Government of Venezuela and associated entities as specified in EO 14373), or any other account as instructed by the U.S. Treasury Department. Further, any contract for transactions covered under GL 46 with the Government of Venezuela, PDVSA, or PDVSA entities must be governed by the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, and contractual disputes shall be resolved in the United States.

On February 3, 2026, OFAC also issued GL 47, authorizing the sale of U.S.-origin diluents to Venezuela.^[5] GL 47 does not limit authorizations to “established U.S. entities” and also does not contain the GL 46 limitation on transactions with PRC-affiliated entities. Unlike GL 46, GL 47 explicitly lists payment processing as an authorized support service—but it does contain similar restrictions on payment terms that are not commercially reasonable, involve debt swaps or payments in gold, or are denominated in digital currency, digital coin, or digital tokens issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, including the petro, as well as entity location-based restrictions.

Finally, on February 10, 2026 OFAC issued GL 48.  GL 48 contains sweeping authorizations for U.S. persons to provide goods, technology, software, or services for the exploration, development, or production of oil or gas in Venezuela, including certain transactions with PDVSA.[6] Related transactions authorized under GL 48 include processing of payments, arranging shipping and logistics services, including chartering vessels, obtaining marine insurance and protection and indemnity coverage, and arranging port and terminal services, including with port authorities or terminal operators that are part of the Government of Venezuela. It also authorizes transactions for the maintenance of oil or gas operations in Venezuela, including the refurbishment or repair of items used for oil or gas exploration, development, or production activities.

GL 48 requires any such covered contracts with the Government of Venezuela, PDVSA, or PDVSA entities be governed by the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, and that any dispute resolution under the contract occur in the United States.  Further, any monetary payment to a blocked person, excluding payments for local taxes, permits, or fees, must be made into the Foreign Government Deposit Funds, as specified in EO 14373.  Restrictions on GL 48 include transactions involving entities in Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, or China (or any entity owned or controlled, by or in a joint venture, with such persons), as well as the formation of new joint ventures or other entities in Venezuela to explore or produce oil or gas. 

Except as provided in paragraph (b) of GL 48, all transactions prohibited by the VSR, including those involving the Government of Venezuela, PDVSA, or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (i.e., the PDVSA entities), that are ordinarily incidental and necessary to the provision from the United States or by a U.S. person of goods, technology, software, or services for the exploration, development, or production of oil or gas in Venezuela are authorized, provided that: (1) any contract for such transactions with the Government of Venezuela, PDVSA, or PDVSA Entities specify that the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States govern the contract and that any dispute resolution under the contract occur in the United States[7]; and (2) any monetary payment to a blocked person, excluding payments for local taxes, permits, or fees, is made into the Foreign Government Deposit Funds, as specified in EO 14373, or any other account as instructed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Note that there is no bilateral investment treaty between the United States and Venezuela. As discussed further below in Section II, there is a bilateral investment treaty between Spain and Venezuela, which provides for arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. (The Spain-Venezuela treaty also states that ICSID arbitration is available; however, Venezuela withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 2012.)

Financial Institution Considerations

In the short to medium term, we anticipate that OFAC will rely on the issuance of both General Licenses and Specific Licenses rather than a broad lifting of restrictive policies, as the U.S. Administration prefers maximum flexibility to impose its foreign policy and economic/national security agenda. The fact that OFAC reserves the right to revoke or amend its General Licenses at any time (as it has done with Venezuela-related General Licenses in the past) gives the Administration additional leverage and ability to dictate terms or respond to the Venezuelan government’s policy decisions. From a transaction perspective, the evolving geopolitical landscape in the region underscores that over-reliance on any General License should be viewed with caution—and even where wind-down periods are granted after the removal/revocation of a General License, the uncertainty around the timeline and likelihood of being granted a Specific License by OFAC for a particular transaction will always be a factor. However, it does appear OFAC is laying the groundwork for continuing to relax certain industry- and sector-specific restrictions that will build on the framework of General Licenses 46, 47, and 48. 

From a licensing perspective, any transaction which would otherwise be prohibited by the active 31 CFR Part 591 VSR will have to be closely scrutinized under applicable active General Licenses and associated OFAC FAQs/guidance, as these General Licenses will generally come with their own sets of conditions and limitations. To the extent Santander seeks to fit within the scope of a client’s Specific License, additional analysis and scrutiny should be applied to ensure the validity of such strategy. When crafting a sanctions compliance strategy for a given transaction, it is important to remember that in addition to OFAC’s VSR program, many individuals, entities, and vessels associated with Venezuela remain designated under other U.S. economic sanctions programs, including activity-based programs such as the Counter Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions, the Counter Terrorism Sanctions, and the Global Magnitsky Sanctions. OFAC’s financial institution “blocked property” and “rejected” transaction reporting requirements must also be considered in the context of transactions involving such restricted parties.

From a jurisdictional standpoint, key U.S. nexus triggers generally are tied to the direct/indirect involvement of U.S. financial institutions, the presence of U.S. persons or U.S.-origin goods in a transaction, the facilitation of a non-U.S. person’s sanctions violation by a U.S. person (e.g., a U.S. entity supporting a foreign subsidiary to engage with a sanctioned party), or where a non-U.S. person causes a U.S. person to directly or indirectly violate sanctions regulations or engage in conduct that evades such sanctions. We recommend dynamic, comprehensive assessments of sanctions compliance strategies in tandem with transaction evolution, as this prevents changed circumstances from inadvertently triggering problematic actions. We also recommend that, in addition to U.S. economic sanctions, U.S. export controls should be afforded the same level of compliance scrutiny. While U.S. export controls targeting Venezuela are anticipated to relax as more commercial activity between the U.S. and Venezuela is enabled, exporters (and facilitators of export activity) must continue to be cognizant of the risks and avoid assumptions or complacency with respect to export authorizations. While most items subject to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) and classified as EAR99 do not require a license for export to Venezuela, given the number of restricted parties in Venezuela, export compliance strategies must be particularly focused on end-use/end-user due diligence. All items on the EAR’s Commerce Control List currently require a license to Venezuela, although it is anticipated that EAR license exceptions will continue to be expanded for Venezuela.